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Abstract
Distributed replication forms a signicant component in
many distributed systems. We consider migratory solu-
tions for replica location in a large-scale distributed sys-
tem. Replica location strategies decide dynamically how
many times an object is replicated and where it is placed,
in order to ensure availability, attacker-resistance, and
scalability. Most traditional replica location schemes are
static and reactive to failures. This paper presents dy-
namic and migratory schemes for replica location. More
specically, we present a new class of probabilistic proto-
cols called endemic protocols. By using analytical tech-
niques borrowed from the study of non-linear systems,
and through large-scale simulations, we show how an en-
demic protocol can be used in building a decentralized
and persistent le storage service. The protocols contin-
uously migrate a small number of replicas of each object
through the host population. This means an attacker will
not be able to predict the exact number and locations of
all replicas of an object. Contrary to intuition, endemic
protocols can provide good performance by generating
only a constant amount of network trac at each host.
Endemic protocols are resistant to massive failures and
host churn. Existence of even one residual replica of an
object in the system causes the system to regenerate more
replicas. Analytically, endemics have the potential to pre-
serve an object for several human generations, much like
the persistent survival of folklores and endemic diseases
such as common cold. The protocols are also very simple
to implement.
Keywords: Distributed Replication, Replica location,
Endemic protocols, Scalability, Reliability, File Systems.
1 Introduction
Replication of data in distributed systems has been
studied for many years, e.g., databases [8, 10], email
and le systems [16, 17], and more recently, in
peer to peer systems [5]. In a distributed group of
processes, the tasks of replication middleware can
be broadly divided into (a) replica location (place-
ment), and (b) replica management. For a given ob-
ject, replica location decides which processes bear re-
sponsibility for storing replicas of a given object, e.g.,
in Clearinghouse, all servers in the system eventually
receive a copy of each object (\total replication"),
while in Pastry [15], only those processes that hash
to a value close to the object’s hash, store replicas
(\partial replication"). Replica management deals
with how replicas are accessed and updated in a con-
sistent manner, e.g, active and passive replica man-
agement are well known techniques [6].
This paper focuses only on replica location, and
specically, on scalable and reliable solutions for par-
tial replication. Location deals with deciding \how
many" and \where" replicas are located. Most ex-
isting solutions in literature [15, 16] locate replicas
statically and reactively, i.e., the subset of hosts se-
lected to hold replicas of a given object does not
change unless a special event happens, e.g., one of
the hosts could crash.
However, reactive replica location strategies have
several limitations in real-life large-scale distributed
systems. They can be expensive in peer to peer sys-
tems containing millions of hosts, where a large frac-
tion of hosts have short lifetimes (O(several min-
utes)) and rejoin multiple times (6.4 times/day as
reported in the Overnet system [3]). One could re-
strict replicas to be stored only on hosts with at
least a threshold availability [4], but this does not
address the following issue. More importantly, from
a security stand-point, static and reactive strategies
allow an attacker to easily locate and attack all the
individual replicas of an object. A malicious host
could track the current replicas for a given object,
and then subject each of them simultaneously to a
kind of attack (e.g., a DOS attack on each host, sus-
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tained until the host crashed, would suce) in such
way that all copies of the object are destroyed.
We are studying dynamic and migratory repli-
cation strategies because they can avoid the above
drawbacks, and provide other interesting properties.
These strategies proactively move replicas of the ob-
ject among dierent hosts in the system. Thus, an
attacker nds it dicult to locate all the replica
hosts. Further, if the replication protocol is designed
so that the number of replicas is tolerant to host fail-
ures, availability of the object will not be aected by
either short host availability periods or massive fail-
ures in the system.
The problem can be expressed formally as follows:
Distributed Responsibility Migration Prob-
lem: At any point of time in a group G of pro-
cesses, each process is either a responsible process,
or not. Further,
Safety: The number of responsible processes in
the system never becomes zero.
Liveness: If a process p is a responsible process
at give (local) time t0, there is a time t > t0 at which
process p ceases to be a responsible process.
Fairness (optional): Over a long time of run-
ning, each process in the system bears responsibility
for an equal fraction of time.
For a distributed le system application, where
each object is a le, each le has a responsibility
migration protocol running on its behalf. At any
time, the responsible processes in the protocol for
a le are the only ones storing replicas of the le.
Safety ensures that a le, once inserted, never dis-
appears from the system. Liveness ensures that a
responsible process eventually sheds its responsibil-
ity of storing the le forever 1. Static and reactive
strategies attempt to satisfy safety but neither live-
ness nor fairness.
Migrating the replicas of an object can be com-
bined with strategies for replica management. Tradi-
tional replica management techniques such as active
or passive replication can be used, although this will
require the support of a weakly consistent protocol
(e.g., SWIM [7, 9]) that always maintains transitive
connectivity among the subgroup of processes that
are marked as being responsible. Since the focus of
this paper is on replica location, a discussion of the
1This does not preclude the process from becoming respon-
sible again at some later point of time.
interaction with replica management is left to a sep-
arate publication.
Other Applications of Distributed Responsibility Mi-
gration: Besides the distributed le system applica-
tion, we also note the applicability of responsibility
migration algorithms for other coordination activi-
ties, e.g., the subgroup of responsible processes can
be used to globally order multicasts, run a consen-
sus protocol for the group, etc. These are beyond
the scope of this paper.
The problem denition leads to the following im-
possibility result:
Theorem 1 (Impossibility of achieving safety in an
asynchronous network): No migratory replication
protocol can achieve Safety in an asynchronous set-
ting. This is because there exists a run where at
some instant of time, all responsible processes crash
simultaneously.
In this paper, we present a novel probabilistic pro-
tocol for distributed responsibility migration that
achieves liveness, fairness, and probabilistic safety
(i.e., w.h.p., the number of responsible processes in
the system never becomes zero). The behavior of
the new protocol bears resemblance to the persistent
survival of folklores in human society, and common
cold in human populations, both for centuries and in
a manner that resists the death of individuals. Hence
we term the new protocols as Endemic Protocols.
Contrary to intuition, endemic protocols can oer
scalable and reliable behavior w.r.t. liveness, safety,
and fairness, while incurring only a constant message
overhead at each process in the group.
It is also possible to use endemic protocols in the
design of distributed spyware that avoid detection,
or by writers of computer viruses. Hence it is impor-
tant for us to understand the dynamics associated
with these protocols.
A word on the analysis style in this paper. The
behavior of a processes running an endemic protocols
can be expressed as a dierential equation. Hence
our analysis borrows techniques from the classical
study of non-linear dierential equations [18].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses related work and the system model.
Section 3 describes the endemic protocol and Sec-
tion 4 presents a formal analysis. Section 5 presents
simulation results from a prototype implementation.
We conclude in Section 6.
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2 Related Work, and Model
Related Work: Several textbooks, including
the one by Colouris et al [6], provide discussion
of classical replication used in distributed systems.
There has also been signicant recent work. Cohen
and Shenker [5] have proposed proactive replication
schemes for partial replication of les in peer to peer
systems that utilize \blind search". Yu and Vah-
dat [20] study the tradeos between consistency and
availability. Demers et al proposed an epidemic al-
gorithm for complete replication in a database sys-
tem [8]. Gray et al [10] argue against the dangers
of large-scale replication and warn that maintaining
consistency among a large number of replicas might
counter the goal of scalability. Our paper consid-
ers only small numbers of replicas. Ratner et al
considered optimistic partial replication in the Fi-
cus system [14], where the replica nodes of each ob-
ject are organized in a virtual ring. The paper does
not discuss scalable replica location strategies. Ran-
ganathan et al [13] consider replication strategies for
Grid applications, where location and management
are cleanly separated.
R. Anderson, in his 1996 paper [1] outlined an
\Eternity Service" for storage of les across a dis-
tributed system of hosts. The implicit challenge was
\(to design software for a system where) your le,
once posted on the service, cannot be deleted. As
you cannot delete it yourself, you cannot be forced
to delete it, either by abuse of process or by gun
at your wife’s head." Several scalable decentralized
solutions have been proposed towards this problem,
e.g., Oceanstore [11], LOCKSS[12], PAST[15]
An endemic protocol can be seen as a special case
of a probabilistic I/O automata [19]. Yet, we are not
aware of papers that analyze probabilistic protocols
through the use of dierential equations. Finally,
our analysis of endemic protocols bears resemblance
to the analysis of endemic diseases in epidemiology
(e.g., [2]), yet our treatment is motivated by algo-
rithmics and practical considerations.
System Model: We assume a closed group G of
N processes, communicating over an asynchronous
network. Each process may suer from crash-stop
or crash-recovery failures. The closed group assump-
tion means that there are no joins by new processes.
We verify that our protocols perform well in open
goups, in Section 5. The communication medium is
unreliable, and can drop messages or connections.
Each process also knows about the maximal group
membership, i.e., the other N − 1 processes 2. Our
protocol analysis assumes that the group size N is
large enough so that variables that denote the num-
ber of processes in a given state of a nite state ma-
chine can be assumed to be continuous. This also
enables us to assume that these variables vary con-
tinuously in time (as opposed to discretely).
3 Migratory Replication
For concreteness, our discussion directly addresses
the scenario where the endemic protocol is used to
implement a distributed le system. In other words,
the objects that are being replicated will be individ-
ual les. In other applications, the object might sim-
ply be a (replicated) token, giving the holder respon-
sibility. We also restrict our discussion with respect
to a single object only.
3.1 A Simple Solution, and its Drawback
Consider a replica migration protocol where a pro-
cess storing an object replica hands it o to another
process after a while and immediately deletes the ob-
ject. A crash-stop failure of the former process be-
fore the transfer eectively destroys a object replica.
Over time, the number of replicas of a given object
will then go down to zero (unless there is a periodic
refresh). Thus, this algorithm satises Liveness,
but not Safety.
3.2 An Endemic Protocol for Migratory
Replication
We describe the endemic protocol for the responsi-
bility migration problem. At any time, a given pro-
cess is in one of three states with respect to a given
object. If the process is responsible and is storing
a replica of the object, it is in the state Stash. If
the process is not responsible, it could be in one of
two states. The process might be unwilling to store
the object, placing itself in an Averse state. Finally,
the process might be in a Receptive state, meaning
that it is not currently storing a copy of the object,
but is willing to do so. In other words, a process is
responsible if and only if it is in the Stash state.
State actions and transitions are probabilistic.
(i) A process p in the Receptive state periodically
2Well-known results can be used to reduce this size to
logarithmic.
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chooses b targets (b is a small constant) uniformly at
random, and if any of these targets is in the Stash
state, process p changes its state to Stash (after an
object transfer). (ii) A process p in the Stash state
periodically chooses b processes uniformly at ran-
dom; any of the selected target processes that is Re-
ceptive immediately transitions to the Stash state
(after an object transfer). (iii) A process p in the
Stash state also periodically tosses a coin with a bi-
ased heads probability γ (2 [0; 1]) - if the coin falls
heads, process p changes its state to Averse. This
transition is accompanied by a deletion of the object
replica at p. (iv) Finally, a process p in the Averse
state periodically tosses a coin with heads probabil-
ity  (2 [0; 1]), and changes state to Receptive if this
coin falls heads up.
The above protocol is shown in Figure 1. Each
action is performed once at the start of each proto-
col period. Protocol period lengths are xed at all
processes, but their start times are arbitrary across
processes. Our analytical results hold for the aver-
age protocol period duration across the group. No-
tice that the protocol requires neither global clocks
nor global synchronization or agreement.
For the distributed le system application in a
group of hosts, the endemic protocol can be imple-
mented by running two threads per host - a daemon
listening on a standard port for incoming connec-
tions, and another that wakes up periodically. We
also assume that for an object, the (unique) owning
host of the object actively maintains a list of current
object replica holders. This requires each host to
contact the owner of an object when the host makes
a transition into or out of the Stash state 3.
4 Endemic Protocol Analysis
First, we note that the endemic protocol of Fig-
ure 1 satises Liveness if γ > 0. Since the pro-
tocol is symmetric across processes, it also satises
Fairness. The probabilistic safety of the protocol
is discussed at the end of this section.
Let x; y; z respectively be the numbers of recep-
tives, stashers and averse processes in the system at
a given point of time. We analyze the endemic repli-
cation protocol from the previous section in a static
group where x + y + z = N always, N being a large
constant. Our experiments vary N 4.
3As our experiments show, this has low overhead.
4For the purposes of the analysis, we shall also assume that
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Figure 1: A Simple Endemic Protocol: A process is in
one of three states with respect to a object. It is storing the
object only in the Stash state. In the Stash (respectively the
Receptive) state, it periodically selects a small set of processes
to contact, seeking to transfer the object to (resp. from) each
remote process. In the Averse state, it refuses to accept any
transfers to it for the object. The transitions from states Stash
to Averse and Averse to Receptive happen with probabilities
γ and  per round respectively.
If x; y; z are assumed to be continuous variables,
Similar to [2], we assume x; y; z to have real values,
and vary continuously over time. We can write the
rates of change of x; y; z as:
_x = −xy + z
_y = xy − γy
_z = γy − z
Here,  is the \successful contact rate" between
a stasher and a receptive, per protocol period. Re-
call that each stasher or receptive selects b processes
uniformly at random during each protocol period.
If a fraction s of started object transfers complete
successfully, the successful contact rate can be cal-
culated as 1−(1− bN s)2, which reduces to 2b
0
N −( b
0
N )
2,
where b0 = bs. For large N , this gives  = 2bN . For
simplicity, we shall assume henceforth that s = 1,
meaning that b = b0.
Equilibrium occurs when ( _x; _y; _z) = 0. Substitut-
ing in the above equations gives us two equilibria:
(x1; y1; z1) = (N; 0; 0)
(x1; y1; z1) = (γ=;
N−γ=
1+γ= ;
N−γ=
1+=γ ) (2)
The rst equilibrium can result if all copies of the
object disappear from the group. If the number of
stashers thus becomes zero, the object has disap-
peared from the system. Subsequently, all processes
all processes have equal clock speeds; this is not required by
the actual protocol.
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will eventually transition to the Receptive state.
The second equilibrium is more desirable, since
it guarantees Safety. We are thus generally inter-
ested in nding out which of these two equilibrium
points is stable. In other words, given an initial state
that contains an arbitrary combination of stashers,
receptives, and averse processes, how does the group
of processes behave? Which of these two equilibria
does it move towards? How quickly does it move? Is
the protocol self-correcting, i.e., do small displace-
ments from the desirable equilibrium point die out?
For what values of ; ; γ is this true?
These questions would be easy to answer if we
could solve the system of dierential equations (1).
However, an explicit solution is dicult in the case
of this non-linear system of equations. Hence, we
resort to the style of analysis used in the study of
non-linear dynamics [18].
4.1 Are the Equilibria Self-Correcting?
We study this through a perturbation analysis. Let
us assume a small deviation from the equilibrium
point. Let us start the system in the state:
(x0; y0; z0) = (x1(1 + u); y1(1 + v); z1(1 + w))
where 0  u; v;w  1. Substituting this into equa-
tions (1), we get:
γ
 _u = − γ N−γ=1+γ= (1 + u)(1 + v) + N−γ=1+=γ (1 + w)
or _u = N−γ1+γ= (w − u− v) (3a)
where the uv term is ignored as u; v  1. Similarly,
_v = γu (3b)
_w = (v − w) (3c)
where we have assumed that y1 =
N−γ=
1+γ= 6= 0.
Eliminating w and v from equations (3a-c), we get
the following dierential equation for u.
1
 u¨ + _u(
1
 +
1
) + u(1 +
γ
) = 0.
This can be written as a system of two linear dier-
ential equations by introducing a new variable t = _u.
In matrix form, the equations are
_T = A  T , (4)
where
T =
"
t
u
#
; A=
"
−( + ) −(γ + )
1 0
#
Lemma 1: The only equilibrium point in equation
system (4) is (t; u) = (0; 0).
Proof: It is easy to see that _u = 0 implies t = 0,
and then _t = 0 gives u = 0.
Corollary: The equation system (3(a; b; c)) has
only one equilibrium point (u; v;w) = (0; 0; 0). This
is easy to see by substitution of the equilibrium value
u = 0 into equations (3(b; c)).
Theorem 2 (All paths lead to the Second Equi-
librium): For the system of dierential equa-
tions (1), the equilibrium point (x1; y1; z1) =
(γ=; N−γ=1+γ= ;
N−γ=
1+=γ ) is always stable, given that
; γ > 0 and N > γ .
Proof: The behavior of the perturbation (u; v;w)
is given by equation (4), and this has one equilib-
rium point of u = (v = w =)0. The stability of this
equilibrium point depends on the trace and determi-
nant of matrix A. The theory of linear dierential
equation systems tells us [18] that if the trace is nega-
tive and the determinant is positive, the equilibrium
point is stable. However, if the trace and determi-
nant were both positive, the equilibrium would be
unstable. Finally, if the determinant is negative, the
equilibrium is a saddle point (i.e., some trajectories
in the vicinity converge to it, and the rest diverge).
We can calculate:
 = trace(A) = sum of leading diagonal elements
in A = −( + ), and
 = det(A) = (γ + ) (5)
By our choice of parameters,  = N−γ1+γ= > 0 and
; γ > 0. Therefore, we always have that  < 0; >
0. [18] then tells us that the solution of u = 0 for
equations (4) is always stable.
From equations (3(b; c), Lemma 1 and the corol-
lary, we can say that any perturbations ((u; v;w) in
the values of (x; y; z)) around the second non-trivial
equilibrium point will die out, and the system con-
verges back. 2
Corollary: If N < γ and ; γ > 0, then given that
x; y; z > 0, the system of equations (1) has the (sta-
ble) equilibrium point (N; 0; 0).
Lemma 2 (First Equilibrium is a Saddle Point): If
; γ;  > 0 and N > γ , the rst equilibrium point
(x; y; z) = (N; 0; 0) is a saddle point. This means
that it is partly stable; as long as y remains 0, the
system converges back to the equilibrium. How-
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Figure 2: Stability of Non-trivial Equilibrium Point -
Stable Spiral: The plot shows the phase portrait obtained by
simultaneously plotting (x; y) over time. This plot shows the
system started at these initial points - (x; y; z)=blank square
(999,1,0), dark square (0,1,999), blank circle (0,1000,0), dark
circle (500,500,0), blank triangle (500,1,499), dark triangle
(1,500,499), and blank inverted triangle (333,333,334). For
the parameter setting N = 1000;  = 0:01;  = 0:004; γ = 1:0,
the non-trivial equilibrium point above is a stable spiral.
ever, inclusion of even a single stasher will drive the
system towards the second, more stable equilibrium
with a larger, non-zero number of replicas for the
object.
4.2 Convergence Time to Equilibrium
The nature of the trajectories around the second sta-
ble equilibrium point, as well as the time taken by
the protocol for convergence, both depend on the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix A de-
ned in the last section. The eigenvectors of A are
1 = +
p
2−4
2 , and 2 =
−p2−4
2 .
From equations (5) in the last section, we can cal-
culate:
2 − 4 = ( N−γ1+γ= − )2 − 4 N−γ1+γ=γ
Three cases arise:
1. 2 − 4 < 0 (eigenvalues distinct and complex):
The variation of the displacement u in the number
of susceptibles x, as a function of time, can be cal-
culated as:
u = u0e−
t(+)
2 cos(t
q
γ − (−)24 )
where u0 is the initial value of u. Notice that with
time, u decreases exponentially fast to 0. The cosine
term causes a (damped) oscillation in the value of u.
This leads to a stable spiral, which means that the
convergence takes the form of a damped oscillation.
2. 2 − 4 > 0 (eigenvalues distinct and real): The
variation of u as a function of time is given by
u = _u0−2u01−2 e
t1 + _u0−1u02−1 e
t2
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Figure 3: Fault-tolerance A: Number of stashers, re-
ceptives, averse. Massive system failure (of 50% of the
hosts) at time t=2000 in a 100,000 host system does not cause
instability in the system.
where u0 and _u0 are the initial values of u and _u
respectively.
3. 2 − 4 = 0 (eigenvalues equal and real): The
variation of u as a function of time can be calculated
as u = u0e−t
+
2 , where u0 is the initial value of u.
The above discussion reveals that no matter what
the values of ; ; γ (> 0), an initial displacement
from the equilibrium point decreases exponentially
quickly. Thus, the system is self-stabilizing.
Figure 2 illustrates, through examples, one of the
types of equilibrium points possible - stable spirals.
Such plots to show the variation of the three vari-
ables (x; y; z) over time are called phase portraits
[18].
4.3 Probabilistic Safety: Longevity of
Object Replicas
In any computer system, there is always a non-zero
probability of all replicas of a object disappearing
completely. We present a back of the envelope cal-
culation of the likelihood of this happening in an
endemic protocol that is at equilibrium. Each of the
y1 stashers creates new stashers at a rate x11 = γ.
Each stasher is also turning averse at the same rate
γ, thus it is equally likely to die before creating any
new stashers. The likelihood that none of the y1
stashers create any new replicas is = (12)
y1 .
If protocol parameters ; γ; b are chosen so that
y1 = clog2N , the probability of all stashers dying
before creating new ones is 1Nc . If a protocol period
is 6 minutes long, N = 1024 and 50 replicas gives
us an expected object longevity of 1:28 1010 years.
With N = 220 and 100 replicas, we get an object
lifetime of 1:45  1025 years.
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Figure 4: Fault-tolerance B: Zoomed-in version of Fig-
ure 3.
5 Feasibility of an Implementa-
tion: A Simulation Study
We now present initial results from a C implemen-
tation of an endemic protocol, designed for the ap-
plication of a distributed le system for persistent
storage of les. The protocol was tested in a simu-
lated environment, with multiple instances running
synchronously over a simulated network, all on a sin-
gle machine (1.7 Ghz Intel Celeron CPU, 256 MB
RAM, WinXP Pro). Owing to the simplicity of the
implementation, we are able to report numbers in
100,000-host groups.
Some implementation details are in order. The
Mersenne Twister pseudorandom generator is used
for random number generation. The protocol period
is xed at 6 minutes at each host. Each host deletes
a le it is holding at a rate of γ (default=0.1) per pe-
riod. Hosts remember for a while names of les they
have recently deleted (making the host Averse), but
forget such names at a rate of  (default=0.001) per
period (after which they will be Receptive). Dur-
ing each period that a host is receptive towards (or
is stashing) a le, it selects b = 2 other hosts uni-
formly at random from across the group and tries
to transfer a le replica from (resp. to) the remote
host. If a remote host is down, no exchange takes
place - thus, not all \contacts" between a receptive
and a stasher may lead to a le transfer.
In all the plots, the \Time" variable on the hor-
izontal axis is normalized in protocol periods (6
minute intervals).
5.1 Fault-tolerance, Self-Survivability
A 100,000 host system initially at equilibrium is sub-
ject to failure of a random 50% of the hosts. Fig-
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Figure 5: Fault-tolerance C: File Flux Rate = number
of le transfers per protocol period. Occurrence of a
massive number of failures at time t = 2000 does not aect
le flux rate drastically.
ure 3 and Figure 4 show that after the failure at
time t = 2000, the number of averse and the num-
ber of stashers each drop by a factor of about two.
The number of receptives does not change since af-
ter the failure, 50% of the contacts initiated by any
alive host are directed at a crashed host, and are
hence fruitless (this reduces the eective value of b
by 2, thus retaining the original equilibrium value of
x1 = γ ). Figure 4 also shows that there is no wild
variation in the number of stashers in spite of the
massive failure, and that this number converges to
the equilibrium value rather quickly.
The other feature revealed by Figure 4 is an oscil-
lation in the numbers of stashers and receptives in
the system around the respective equilibrium points.
These oscillations are due to the random choice of
contacts in the endemic protocol, but they die out.
The frequency of the oscillations are more sluggish
after the massive failure because fewer contacts are
fruitful.
Notice that the behavior at times t > 2500 is also
characteristic of a heterogeneous setting, where half
the hosts are chronically averse to storing the le or
even perhaps to running the protocol.
The self-correcting property of the endemic proto-
col arises from a constant flux of le replicas in the
system. Figure 5 shows the number of hosts acquir-
ing a new replica of a given le (turning stasher from
receptive).
Reality Check: In a 100,000-strong system, the
host would be storing a given le for 1% of the time
(since number of stashers ’ 1000), eectively 1 hour
every 100 hundred hours, or a little over four days.
The le would be stored for an average duration of
1 hour each time (expected time for a stasher to
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Figure 6: Accuracy of Continuous Time Analysis:
The experimental results from the simulation match well
with those predicted by the mathematical analysis. With
b = 2; γ = 0:1;  = 0:001, the above plot shows the median
number (over a time interval 2000 periods long) and the an-
alytically expected numbers of both receptives and stashers.
The minimum and maximum measured values over this inter-
val are also shown.
turn averse is 1γ = 10 periods). During this hour, an
average of one le transfer would be initiated by a
remote host from this host (number of le transfers
per period ’ 100). A le size distribution such as
that referred to in [15] (average le size is 88.2 KB)
would mean that per le in the system, each host
sees a transfer rate of 88:2 KB 2=100 hours = 3:92
bps.
5.2 Analysis vs. Real Behavior
Our analysis with dierential equations in Section 4
assumed that the number of stashers, receptives, and
averse take on continuous real values, and vary con-
tinuously over time. We compare those analytical
results with numbers from a (discrete) simulation
of the endemic protocol. Figure 6 shows the num-
bers of stashers and receptives (minimum, median,
maximum) measured over a 2000 period duration
(when the group is at equilibrium), and compares
these numbers with those predicted by the mathe-
matical analysis. We observe that the two tally quite
closely, allowing us to verify the authenticity of the
original analysis.
5.3 Lowering the Number of Replicas
The settings in our experiments described earlier in
this section resulted in an average 1000 stashers and
a le flux rate of 100 replicas / period in a 100K-host
system. These numbers can be reduced by choosing
smaller parameter settings. Figures 7 and 8 show
that in a 100K system, choosing  = 10−6; γ = 10−3
results in 100 replicas of a le at any given point of
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
Time
Stash:Alive
Rcptv:Alive
Figure 7: Lowering the Number of Replicas A: In a
setting with  = 10−6; γ = 10−3, the number of stashers and
replicas in a 100, 0000 host system is very small. Massive
failure of 50% of the hosts at time t=5000 causes the system to
stabilize quickly. However, we do notice that the stabilization
is more sluggish than in earlier settings with higher values of
; γ.
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Figure 8: Lowering the Number of Replicas B: The
total number of le replicas transferred across the system
stays very small. Notice that the massive failure occurring
at t=5000 does not aect the le flux rate.
time, and a le transfer rate as low as 1 or 2 per
period.
If each protocol period were 6 minutes long, these
settings imply a bandwidth utilization (assuming an
average le size of 88.2 KB) of 3:92  10−3 bps per
le per host.
5.4 Untraceability of Replicas
Figure 9 shows the distribution of stashers over time
in a population of N = 1000 hosts, with protocol
parameters b = 2; γ = 0:1;  = 0:001. The stable
number of stashers is 88:63. The distribution of the
stashers (dark dots) does not appear to have correla-
tions either in time or across the host id. Thus, the
plot reveals the following properties of the protocol:
(a) Replica Untraceability: Replicas of a le are
distributed across a random subset (and number) of
hosts, and this distribution varies with time. This
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Figure 9: Replica Untraceability and Load Balanc-
ing: For a population of N = 1000 hosts, the plot shows
which hosts are stashers at the end of every protocol period.
The absence of signicant horizontal lines indicates good load
balancing (no hosts store a replica for very long). The absence
of any correlations w.r.t. time or hostid in the gure shows
the diculty faced by an attacker who seeks to destroy all
replicas of the le.
makes it extremely dicult for an attacker to guess
accurately the location of all replicas of a le. In
fact, unless the attacker knows about the location of
all the replicas of a le at a given point of time and
destroys all these copies before any new stashers are
created (with the current parameters, one stasher is
created every 40.6 seconds), the le will survive in-
side the system.
(b) Load Balancing: No hosts are unnecessarily
overloaded, since dark lines appear to be uniformly
distributed vertically.
5.5 Trace-based simulations: Eect of
Host Churn
We study the behavior of endemic protocols in an
open group where new processes are allowed to ar-
rive into the system. Besides withstanding mas-
sive host failures, distributed protocols are also re-
quired to tolerate dynamic and continuous stresses.
Deployed peer-to-peer systems for le sharing are
known to face one such kind of dynamic stress known
as \churning of hosts" - continuous arrival and fail-
ure of hosts. High churn rates have the potential to
disrupt system-wide performance for long periods.
We investigate the behavior of the endemic pro-
tocol when subject to the kinds of host availability
seen in the Overnet p2p system (availability traces
obtained from the authors of [3]). Due to the lim-
ited sizes of these available traces, our system was
restricted to a maximum of 2000 hosts. The origi-
nal traces were taken at 1 hour intervals, but were
smoothed over each hour for our experiments. Typ-
ical rates of churn observed from the traces range
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Figure 10: Eect of Host Churn A: Churn traces were
injected hourly into the system with the protocol period set
to 6 minutes at each host. This plot shows that the numbers
of stashers, averse and receptives remain stable in the system,
and the the number of stashers stays low.
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Figure 11: Eect of Host Churn B: For the experiment
in Figure 10, this plot shows the number of state transitions,
per protocol period, across hosts.
from 10% to 25% of the system size per hour.
We assume the worst case behavior w.r.t. discon-
necting hosts, i.e., they delete all le replicas they
are holding when they leave the system. When they
rejoin the system, they are in the receptive state to-
wards all les but do not participate in any startup
le transfers.
The protocol period was set to 6 minutes, and the
values of  = 0:005; γ = 0:1; b = 32 used.
Figures 10 and 11 show the system behavior when
the churning of nodes from each (hourly) trace le
was spread out evenly throughout the hour. These
plots also show the low le flux rate and stability of
number of stashers in the face of churn.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how a simple endemic
protocol could be used to implement dynamic and
migratory replica location in a large-scale distributed
system. The discussion has been in the context of
implementing a stable, forever, probabilistically in-
destructible and low cost solution towards forever
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storage of les in a distributed setting. The pro-
tocol species three states - receptive, stash and
averse - for each host w.r.t. each le in the sys-
tem. It also species (probabilistic) transitions be-
tween these states. Through the use of analytical
techniques traditionally used in the study of infec-
tious diseases and non-linear dynamical systems, we
are able to show that the endemic protocol is self-
correcting and converges back to the equilibrium
quickly even after massive failures. The protocol is
also well-behaved under the kinds of host churn seen
in today’s peer to peer systems. The protocol has a
low network bandwidth usage, and migrates replicas
of a le across the population of hosts, making it
dicult for an attacker to track and delete all copies
of a le.
Continuing Work: We are building a distributed
le system based on endemic protocols. The design
issues deal with bridging ideas in this paper with
replica management, e.g., coordinating replica hold-
ers to ensure le consistency.
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